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Psychopathy, Agency, and Practical Reason 
Psychopaths exhibit a philosophically interesting combination of deficits and rational 
competences. They appear perfectly capable of basic means-end reasoning. They typically 
perform at or above average on intelligence tests, and many are quite adept at employing 
sophisticated forms of reasoning in order to skillfully manipulate others. Still, psychopaths seem 
profoundly impaired in at least one important domain of practical reasoning, moral reasoning. 
Theorists tend to agree that psychopaths lack the capacity to competently recognize and/or 
respond to moral reasons.  
Theorists specify and explain this impairment in a variety of ways. Some afford 
explanatory roles to certain emotional abnormalities, such as difficulties empathizing or 
experiencing negative affects. Others point to deficits that are not necessarily construed as 
emotive, such as an inability to recognize the interests and/or authority of others as intrinsically 
reason-giving, an inability to value, insufficiently unified agency, lack of self-control, or general 
learning deficiencies. As theorists have noted, many of these features are not merely relevant to 
moral reasoning, but they also bear on the capacity for practical reasoning more broadly.  
Philosophers have urged that considerations about the psychopath’s capacity for practical 
rationality can help to advance some metaethical debates. These debates include the role of 
rational faculties in moral judgment and action, the relationship between moral judgment and 
moral motivation, and the capacities required for morally responsible agency.  In what follows, I 
discuss how the psychopath’s capacity for practical reason features in these debates, and I 
identify several takeaway lessons from the relevant literature. Specifically, I show how the 
insights contained therein can illuminate the complex structure of practical rationality, inform 
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our standards for an adequate theory of practical reason, and frame our thinking about the 
significance of rational capacities in moral theory and social practice.  
 
1 Psychopathy 
Let’s first consider what the term psychopath is meant to capture.1 We are not, for example, 
interested in the “psychopath” that we often find in popular cinema: the blood-thirsty sadist, bent 
on doing evil for evil’s sake. Actual psychopaths are rarely so committed and not especially 
sadistic. However, they typically do engage in dangerous, and sometimes violent, behavior.  
 Psychopathy is a personality disorder that involves a tendency toward antisocial 
behaviors (e.g., threatening behavior such as verbal abuse or violence, repeated criminal 
conduct) and certain emotional-interpersonal deficits (e.g., shallow affect, lack of empathy, 
inability to feel guilt). The most commonly used diagnostic tool for identifying psychopathy is a 
revised version of the Psychopathy Checklist (PCL-R). The PCL-R scores subjects according to 
the extent that their behaviors and attitudes reflect the twenty items on the checklist. The items –
characteristics such as superficial charm, callousness, impulsivity, grandiose sense of self-worth, 
manipulative behavior, lack of realistic long-term goals, delinquency, etc. – are measured on a 0-
2 point scale, and a score of 30 suffices for a psychopathy diagnosis. The average person scores 
about 4. Psychopaths make up less than one percent of the total population and are 
overwhelmingly male (Kiehl and Buckholtz 2010).2  
1 There is a worry that in making general – and in particular, moral – claims about “the psychopath,” we risk 
inappropriately marginalizing large groups of actual people. That is not my intention. I take it that not all who have 
been diagnosed with psychopathy neatly fit the following criteria, and so we should be cautious about 
indiscriminately extending potentially harmful judgments based on this model to those who identify as psychopaths. 
Also, it is not without some regret that I use the term “psychopath” here, as opposed to “psychopathic individual,” 
and I do so only for the purpose of maintaining continuity and cohesion with the relevant literature. I thank Hanna 
Pickard for helpful discussion on this point. 
2 Consequently, I will use masculine pronouns when referring to psychopaths.  
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Psychopaths do not usually suffer from compulsions, delusions, or any obvious 
intellectual impairments. They can be brilliant and charismatic. Some are successful at evading 
criminal prosecution and occasionally achieve positions of wealth and power. In some respects, 
psychopaths blend in with society rather well. But they diverge in others. They are quick to anger 
and often lash out fiercely when others interfere with their aims. They are also known to coolly 
and remorselessly employ violence as a means to achieving their goals (Blair 2008).  
Though psychopaths are sometimes superficially charming, they are often considered 
incapable of (and uninterested in) meaningful relationships. According to some clinicians, they 
lack the capacity to love (Cleckley 1976; Hare 1993). Despite their egocentricity and 
intelligence, they often engage in impulsive behavior that is not only harmful to others, but 
antithetical to their own interests. Robert Hare offers an example of such behavior when he 
describes the actions of one psychopath who decided to stop for beer on his way to a party but 
realized he’d forgotten his wallet. Hare explains, “Not wanting to walk back, he picked up a 
heavy piece of wood and robbed the nearest gas station, seriously injuring the attendant” (1993, 
59).  
 While psychopaths perform comparatively well on most cognitive measures – including 
IQ tests and (some) moral reasoning tasks – they typically do poorly on one task that four year-
old children tend to perform with relative ease, Elliot Turiel’s Moral/Conventional Distinction 
Task (MCT). The MCT measures one’s ability to distinguish between moral and conventional 
norms, where transgressions of the former are taken to be more serious, less permissible, and less 
authority dependent (Turiel 1983). Examples of typical moral transgressions include hair pulling 
and hitting, while examples of conventional transgressions might include drinking soup from the 
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bowl and wearing pajamas to school. Psychopaths have demonstrated considerable difficulties 
identifying the relevant distinction (Blair 1995). 
 Certain conversational oddities seem to reflect peculiar gaps in the psychopath’s 
understanding.  Consider one psychopath who, having just described how he kidnapped a 
woman, repeatedly raped her, and slit her throat, said to his interviewer: “Do you have a girl? 
Because I think it’s really important to practice the three C’s: caring, communication and 
compassion. That’s the secret to a good relationship. I try to practice the three C’s in all my 
relationships” (Kiehl and Buckholtz, 2010, 25). Another psychopath referred to his mother as the 
“most beautiful person in the world,” confessed to stealing her jewelry as a child, and then 
added, “You know, I never really knew the bitch – we went our separate ways” (Hare 1993, 40). 
While psychopaths often use moral and emotional terms, their conversational exchanges 
often suggest that they don’t really understand the concerns and emotional experiences of others. 
One psychopath boasted about how he benefitted his rape victims: “There'd be interviews with 
the victims. They'd get their names in the paper. Women, for example, would say nice things 
about me, that I was really polite and considerate, very meticulous…Some of them thanked me” 
(Hare 1993, 43). Or again, consider the words of another rapist, high on the PCL-R, who 
admitted confusion over his victim’s feelings: “They are frightened, right? But, you see, I don't 
really understand it. I've been scared myself, and it wasn't unpleasant” (ibid, 44).  
 These apparent deficits in understanding distinguish psychopaths from average violent 
criminals. To this, we can add that psychopaths also frequently exhibit distinctive physiological 
abnormalities. They show reduced responsiveness to emotional stimuli and often fail to exhibit 
the normal bodily reactions associated with registering the need to reverse one’s behavior in light 
of negative outcomes (Blair 2008). Some imaging studies suggest that psychopaths have 
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underdeveloped neural structures in brain areas involved in processing emotions, motivation and 
self-control (Kiehl and Buckholtz 2010, 27).  
 With the above sketch in hand, we can now turn to the role of the psychopath’s capacity 
for practical reason in philosophical discourse.  
  
 2 Psychopathy and Practical Reason in Philosophical Discourse 
As I indicated in the introduction, considerations about the psychopath’s capacity for practical 
reason have featured in at least three domains of philosophical investigation: (1) the role of 
rational faculties in moral judgment and action, (2) the relationship between moral judgment and 
moral motivation, and (3) the capacities required for morally responsible agency. The first area 
concerns the dispute between moral rationalists and moral sentimentalists. The second concerns 
the debate between motivational judgment internalists and motivational judgment externalists. 
And the third concerns two competing views about the capacities required for moral 
responsibility: the rational competence view and the moral competence view. 
 
2.1 Moral Rationalism and Moral Sentimentalism 
The debate between moral rationalists and moral sentimentalists is a nebulous one. Historically, 
it has concerned the order of priority, and respective roles, of reason and emotion in morality. As 
some have framed the guiding question: Is morality more like math or beauty (Gill 2007)?  
Moral rationalism is associated with the claim that morality is a species of practical 
rationality. As Jeanette Kennett helpfully puts the point, moral rationalists are minimally 
committed to the claims that certain rational capacities are essential to moral agency and moral 
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judgments are judgments about reasons – i.e., in judging it wrong to Ф, an agent takes herself to 
have identified a consideration that counts against Ф-ing (2010, 251).3   
 Moral sentimentalists, on the other hand, typically afford pride of place to sentiment and 
emotional capacities in moral judgment and action. Some argue that empirical facts about 
psychopathy support a sentimentalist, rather than a rationalist, view of morality. The psychopath 
appears to be morally impaired, despite having (what are often taken to be) intact rational 
abilities. Given psychopaths’ well-documented emotional deficits, sentimentalists can easily 
explain this, but not so for moral rationalists. Or so the challenge goes. 
 Jesse Prinz (2006), for example, advances a view on which emotions are both necessary 
and sufficient for moral judgments, adducing findings about psychopathy to support the 
necessity claim. He characterizes psychopathy as “the perfect test case” for the thesis that 
emotions are necessary for moral development. Prinz argues that owing to deficits in core 
negative emotions, such as fear and sadness, psychopaths cannot acquire empathetic distress or 
guilt and are consequently unable to make moral judgments (2006, 32). On his view, the relevant 
emotional deficits constitute the “root cause” of their antisocial behavior (ibid).  
 Shaun Nichols (2002, 2004) takes a similar approach. According to Nichols, the empirical 
evidence suggests that psychopaths have impaired capacities for making moral judgment, but 
contra what rationalists might have us expect, the relevant deficit is a defective emotional 
response. Nichols cites psychopaths’ difficulty with the Moral/Conventional Distinction Task 
(MCT) as evidence of moral impairment, and the clinical description of the psychopath’s 
emotional deficits as evidence of emotional impairment. He argues that psychopaths’ emotional 
deficits inhibit their ability to make “core moral judgments,” where core moral judgments “are 
3 See also, Michael Smith 1994.  
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judgments that implicate ‘Sentimental Rules,’ or rules prohibiting actions that are independently 
likely to elicit strong negative affect.”4 On his account, rationalist views seem ill-suited to 
explain the psychopath’s poor performance on the MCT, given that psychopaths seem rationally 
competent and very young children and many individuals with severe cognitive disabilities do 
well on the task (2002, 296). 
Moral rationalists have sought to defuse the sentimentalist challenge by arguing that: (1) 
evidence that emotions play important roles in moral judgment and action does not undermine 
(all varieties of) moral rationalism, and (2) psychopaths have deficits in practical reason that 
might explain their moral impairments.  
In support of (1), Kennett argues that rationalists can comfortably accommodate a 
significant role for sentiments in morality, noting that Immanuel Kant regarded “moral feeling” 
as a subjective precondition for “receptiveness to reason’s constraints” (2002, 354). Kennett 
suggests several rationalist-friendly interpretations of the psychopath’s emotional-moral 
impairment. Psychopaths seem to lack reverence for reason, or again, displeasure at cognitive 
dissonance – affective phenomena that may facilitate susceptibility to, and effective employment 
of, reason (2002, 355; 2010, 256).5  In a similar vein, Heidi Maibom suggests that emotional 
deficits might impact the psychopath’s moral abilities “through practical reason alone,” thus 
leaving moral rationalism unscathed. If, for example, psychopaths’ deficits in negative emotions 
inhibit moral education “through reward-punishment centered learning,” as Prinz suggests, then 
a rationalist interpretation of the relevant moral impairment seems apt, notwithstanding the role 
4 Nichols explains that core moral judgments are guided by an “internally represented body of information, a 
‘normative theory’ prohibiting behavior that harms others” (2002, 16) and “some affective mechanism that is 
activated by suffering in others” (ibid, 18).  
5 Kennett, following her interpretation of Kant, suggests that reverence for reason, understood as “the concern to act 
in accordance reason,” is the core moral motive, and suggests that the psychopath’s “indifference to reason is the 
key to his behavior” (2002, 355). For an insightful response to Kennett on this point, see Victoria McGeer 2008.  
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played by emotion (2010, 8). After all, the ability to acquire knowledge via reward-punishment 
centered learning is a rational ability.  
Moral rationalists have also sought to defend their position by arguing directly for (2), the 
view that psychopaths also have rational deficits that might explain their moral impairment. 
Maibom, for example, highlights a host of cognitive difficulties that might inhibit the 
psychopath’s capacity for practical reason. Psychopaths are notoriously impulsive, have inflated 
notions of their abilities, and have trouble adjusting their behavior in light of negative outcomes. 
On Maibom’s account, these attentional problems, inaccurate self-estimates, and “reversal 
deficits” negatively impact the psychopath’s abilities to will the necessary and sufficient means 
to his ends, to coordinate his intentions with foreseeable consequences of his actions, and to 
coherently universalize maxims (2005, 239, 247). Maibom concludes that as these factors bear 
on one’s competence in grasping and enacting moral duties, the psychopath’s practical 
irrationality plausibly explains his moral impairment.  
Similarly, Kennett argues that the psychopath is at best short-term instrumentally 
rational, lacking any coherent, extended conception of his ends and often failing to adopt 
reasonable means toward achieving his proclaimed ends (2002, 2006). The psychopath might 
profess to have lofty goals, but his goals are often both fleeting and unrealistic. Within the same 
day, a psychopath might form and give up his plan to become a professional athlete, deciding 
now to become a doctor – all while lacking the requisite skills and training (and any plans to 
acquire them) for either. Kennett also points out that psychopaths often employ “grossly 
disproportionate means to their immediate ends” (2006, 76). Think here of the psychopath who, 
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wanting to buy beer for a party, decided to brutally assault and rob a service-station attendant 
rather than return home for his forgotten wallet.6  
Doubtless, psychopaths often successfully engage in means-end reasoning. Importantly, 
though, Kennett suggests that basic means-end reasoning does not suffice for rational agency, the 
“markers” of which include the capacities for normative reflection and rational self-control 
(2010, 254).  She writes, “A person who could not reflect upon whether or not his desires 
provided ‘reasons’ for action, whose desires were entirely unresponsive to such reflection, or 
who could not be guided by the results of his deliberations, through exercises of planning and 
self-control, would not count as a rational agent” (ibid, 252).7 The psychopath, being severely 
limited in his abilities to take an evaluative perspective on his desires and to delay their 
immediate satisfaction, seems to exemplify this rational defect. Drawing on child development 
research, Kennett explains that the capacities for normative reflection and rational self-control 
typically begin to emerge around the same time as the capacity for making the 
moral/conventional distinction, thus suggesting a link between psychopaths’ rational deficits and 
their moral impairment (ibid, 253).  
 
2.2 Motivational Judgment Internalism and Motivational Judgment Externalism 
Considerations about psychopathy have also entered into the debate between motivational 
judgment internalists and motivational judgment externalists. In its barest form, motivational 
judgment internalism (MJI) posits a necessary connection between moral judgments and moral 
6 Kennett and Steve Matthews discuss this case in a later work, describing the psychopath’s actions as “not just 
immoral,” but “stupid” (2008, 225).  
7 Importantly, not all would agree that the defects Kennett identifies here constitute practical irrationality. First, one 
might draw a distinction between structural rationality and responsiveness to reasons (see, for example, John 
Broome’s entry in this volume). Second, even those who associate practical rationality with reasons-responsiveness 
might deny that failure to engage in normative reflection represents irrationality, as opposed to a mere failure to 
exercise one kind of rational capacity. Thanks to Kurt Sylvan for prompting me to highlight this point.  
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motivation (Smith 1994; Roskies 2003). MJI is often construed in terms of the following thesis: 
If Agent A judges that Ф-ing is morally wrong, then necessarily A will be motivated not to Ф, or 
again, if A judges that s/he morally ought to Ф, then necessarily she will be motivated to Ф.8  
MJE is just the denial of MJI. According to motivational judgment externalists, moral 
judgments do not entail corresponding motivations. A common objection against MJI is the 
possibility of a “rational amoralist,” someone who knows and understands the dictates of 
morality (and presumably makes moral judgments) but doesn’t care about morality and is 
unmotivated to comply with moral norms (Brink 1989). The psychopath – who, on some 
understandings, seems similar to the rational amoralist – might then pose a challenge for 
proponents of MJI.9 Internalists have typically responded by insisting that psychopaths 
(sociopaths, etc.) don’t really make moral judgments, but only do so in “an inverted commas 
sense,” and thus pose no threat to MJI (Smith 1994).10  
As internalist replies to the psychopathy objection tend to employ many of the same 
arguments canvassed in section 2.1, we can afford to be relatively brief here. In support of their 
claim that psychopaths do not make moral judgments, theorists often cite the psychopath’s poor 
performance on certain empirical measures and oddities in his use of moral language. Kennett 
and Cordelia Fine (2008), for example, discuss myriad studies that, on their account, suggest that 
psychopaths do not make genuine moral judgments. Familiarly, they note that psychopaths have 
8 Some theorists have offered weaker formulations. Michael Smith’s preferred version holds that if Agent A judges 
that Ф-ing is wrong, then either A will be motivated not to Ф or A is practically irrational (1994, 61; 2008, 211).  
9 Adina Roskies (2003) cited research findings on a group of patients with “acquired sociopathy” as evidence against 
MJI. According to Roskies, following injuries to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex area of the brain, these patients 
continued to have normal moral beliefs and to make moral judgments, but they were no longer inclined to act in 
accordance with those beliefs and judgments, thus falsifying MJI (2003, 63). 
10 We find sentimentalists on both sides of the debate. Prinz, for example, suggests that psychopaths “furnish 
internalists with a useful piece of supporting evidence,” insofar as their co-occurrence in moral motivation and 
moral competences appears to be linked (2007, 44).  Nichols argues that considerations about psychopathy suggest 
against some varieties of internalism, including “conceptual judgment internalism about moral judgment” and 
“empirical internalism about harm-norm judgment” (2004, 109-15). 
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significant difficulties drawing the moral/conventional distinction, forming value judgments 
without making exceptions of themselves, and correctly deploying moral concepts in 
conversation (2008, 174-8).11 Kennett and Steve Matthews (2008) raise similar points, adding 
that the psychopath’s more general rational impairment renders him a poor candidate for the 
“rational amoralist.” As they argue, psychopaths are only “very implausibly viewed as rationally 
unified agents,” given their lack of facility with normative reasons (2008, 222, 224). Owing to 
poor self-regulation skills, shortened attention spans, and impoverished conceptions of their own 
well-being, psychopaths are unable to grasp, and to guide themselves by, the normative 
considerations that typically unify and sustain extended agency. We find evidence for this in 
their self-destructive behaviors and erratic, contradictory speech (ibid, 223-4). Kennett and 
Matthews urge that these deficits are likely related to psychopaths’ moral deficits, since moral 
agency and rational agency apparently go together in the normal case. Adducing child 
development studies, they conclude that since the higher-order cognitive capacities required for 
self-constitution and extended agency are the “same capacities that make us rationally 
susceptible to moral claims,” it seems unlikely there exist rational amoral agents (ibid, 228). 
Some have expressed skepticism about the psychopath’s supposed inability to make 
genuine moral judgments. In responding to Kennett and Fine, for example, Roskies (2008) 
argues that the evidence suggests that psychopaths reason differently about moral norms, but not 
that they altogether fail to make moral judgments. Roskies also doubts that the ability to draw 
moral/conventional distinctions is necessary for making moral judgments. She writes, 
“Psychopaths are still cognizant of what is morally right and wrong… Even if their concepts are 
impaired, it is plausible that they are nonetheless moral concepts” (2008, 202).  Relatedly, Walter 
11 In a later work, Kennett argues that psychopaths lack competence with moral concepts, as they are not 
“conversable” with the relevant terms (2010, 246). 
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Sinnott-Armstrong (2014) argues that the empirical evidence concerning psychopaths’ abilities 
to make moral judgments is inconclusive. He suggests that the relevant studies often suffer from 
methodological limitations and sometimes yield mixed results – noting, for example, that 
psychopaths tend to perform well on a modified version of the MCT (2014, 195).12  
 Much of the dialectic turns on whether internalists and externalists can agree upon 
criteria for determining whether a moral judgment has been made that doesn’t presuppose the 
presence or absence of moral motivation. Some have proposed that we can make headway by 
acknowledging that facility with moral concepts is at least necessary for moral judgment, or 
again, that we can use the MCT to help identify the key features of a distinctly moral judgment.13 
As we have seen, however, theorists have questioned both the criteria themselves and the validity 
of the tools used to measure them.  
 
2.3 Morally Responsible Agency: Rational Competence versus Moral Competence 
Theorists have employed considerations about psychopathy to illuminate another important 
metaethical issue: the matter of which capacities are required for morally responsible agency. 
 Though many creatures might harm us, we only hold some of them morally responsible 
for their harmful actions. For example, lions, toddlers, and schizophrenic people in the grips of a 
psychotic episode sometimes inflict harm, but we typically do not blame them for doing so. They 
are unable to fully grasp the nature of their actions and to exercise rational control over their 
behaviors. Thus, they are not appropriate candidates for the blaming and praising attitudes (e.g., 
resentment and gratitude) by which we hold one another morally responsible.  
12 For discussion of recent empirical work on psychopathy and moral judgment, see Sinnott-Armstrong 2014, 193-9. 
13 See, for example, Kennett 2010 and Kumar 2016.  
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Psychopaths represent a more perplexing case. At the very least, psychopaths have some 
understanding of societal norms and how to comply with them. They know that theft and assault 
are grounds for legal punishment and sometimes show self-restraint in order to avoid such 
penalties. What’s more, psychopaths often demonstrate awareness of moral expectations. They 
know, for example, that helping others is generally considered morally good while deceit is 
considered wrong. They sometimes use this knowledge to manipulate others, representing 
themselves in conversation as “generous” or “honest” to get what they want. These competences 
seem to set psychopaths apart from lions, toddlers, and those suffering from psychotic delusions.  
 On some accounts, psychopaths’ rational capacities render them eligible candidates for 
blame. T.M. Scanlon, for example, claims that “a rational creature who fails to see the force of 
moral reasons” might be properly subject to moral criticism, provided he can “understand that a 
given action will injure others and can judge that this constitutes no reason against so acting” 
(1998, 288).  Similarly, Matthew Talbert argues that despite being “morally blind,” psychopaths 
are blameworthy for their actions because they are “capable of making decisions on the basis of 
judgments about reasons” (2008, 519).  Talbert describes psychopaths as effective practical 
reasoners who can “count the pleasure of having a possession of yours as a reason to take it from 
you and…form the judgment that nothing about the effect of this action on you is a reason to 
refrain from performing it” (2008, 522). On these views, owing to psychopaths’ rational 
competence, their actions can express offensive judgments that legitimize blaming attitudes. 
 Many theorists reject the view that mere rational competence – i.e., facility with reasons 
in general – suffices for moral accountability. Gary Watson, for example, is among those who 
argue that moral accountability requires competence with moral reasons in particular. On this 
view, an otherwise rationally competent psychopath would be exempt from moral responsibility 
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if he is unable to recognize and/or respond to moral reasons.14 This claim raises questions about 
the particular capacities required for the kinds of recognition and responsiveness at issue. What 
must morally competent agents be able “to do” with moral reasons? And why should we think 
that psychopaths lack the relevant abilities? Watson employs an argument from moral 
communication (henceforth, AMC) to answer these questions.   
Watson argues that resentment, along with other reactive attitudes by which we hold 
others morally accountable, “are incipiently forms of communication, which make sense only on 
the assumption that the other can comprehend the message” (1987, 264). He explains that 
resentment expresses a moral demand for reasonable regard and suggests that very young 
children and psychopaths may lack sufficient moral understanding to be proper recipients of the 
relevant demand (ibid, 271).15 Watson later elaborates on this position, describing psychopaths 
as “unreachable by the language of moral address” due to their inabilities to recognize moral 
demands (and the authority of those who address them) as intrinsically reason-giving (2011, 
309). On his view, psychopaths cannot see our demands that they refrain from harming us as 
anything but coercive pressures, supplying at best instrumental reasons to comply. Being unable 
to see the normative force of moral demands, psychopaths are infelicitous targets of resentment. 
AMC has been endorsed by a number of theorists, many of whom emphasize the role of 
emotional capacities in giving uptake to moral address.16 Some stress the import of being able to 
14 See also Wallace 1996; Shoemaker 2007 and 2015; and Fischer & Ravizza 2008. Paul Litton argues that there is 
no “meaningful disagreement” between mere rational competence theorists and moral competence theorists, since 
“the capacity for rational self-governance entails the capacity to comprehend and act on moral considerations” 
(2008, 351). For arguments that moral responsibility turns on the possession of moral knowledge rather than any 
particular capacity, see Elinor Mason 2017.  
15 Here, Watson follows P.F. Strawson 1962. Watson also raises the case of Robert Harris, a man who callously 
murdered two innocent teenage boys, but was himself a victim of brutal abuse from a very young age. Watson 
doesn’t identify Harris as a psychopath but uses his case to consider whether some agents “of evil,” being unfit for 
moral dialogue, are inappropriate targets of resentment due to “constraints on moral address” (1987, 268-274).  
16 See Scanlon 2008; and Talbert 2008 and 2012 for rejections of the argument from moral communication. See 
Coleen Macnamara 2015 for a detailed response to these challenges.  
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feel guilt in response to (negative) reactive attitudes, suggesting that psychopaths are not morally 
responsible.17 David Shoemaker focuses on two broader emotional deficits that seem to underlie 
the psychopath’s lack of guilt: his inabilities to care about others and relatedly, to experience (a 
certain kind of) empathy. On Shoemaker’s view, the capacity to care about others is necessary 
for being motivated to comply with the reasons exchanged in moral address (2007, 84). He also 
posits that since the emotional aspect of moral address calls on "the addressee to imaginatively 
step into the shoes of the other in order to feel what one has put him or her through,” moral 
accountability requires the capacity for “identifying empathy” (2007, 93). Since the psychopath 
cannot care about the agent who addresses him with resentment, he cannot give the appropriate 
identifying empathetic response, and is thus exempt from moral accountability (ibid; 2015, 146).  
The capacities for caring and valuing often play central roles in accounts of morally 
responsible agency, and not just for proponents of AMC. Antony Duff, for example, argues that 
moral competence requires “a participant understanding” of at least some values (moral or not) 
where this involves a “creative capacity to understand the significance of the value…and to 
discuss, extend, and criticize its application” (1977, 195). Duff ties understanding the 
significance of values to emotional sensibilities and a practical commitment to the values in 
question, where the latter is explained in terms of seeing those values as providing reasons for 
action. He concludes that owing to deficits in these areas, the psychopath, while intellectually 
competent, is “seriously defective in practical understanding and rationality,” and no more 
“answerable for his actions… than… a young child” (ibid, 199). 
17 Stephen Darwall argues that an appropriate addressees of resentment (and its implicit demand) must be able to 
“…make the same demands of, themselves through acknowledging their validity as in self-reactive attitudes like 
guilt…” (2006, 79). For Darwall, this ability is a matter of competence with the “second-personal reasons” 
exchanged in moral address, where he describes such reasons as agent-relative reasons “whose validity is grounded 
in presupposed normative relations between persons…” (2006, 78). Macnamara argues that a function of reactive 
attitudes is securing uptake from their addressees and since “uptake of [resentment] amounts to feeling guilt and 
expressing it via amends,” eligible targets of resentment must be able to feel guilt (2015, 212). 
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Carl Elliott and Grant Gillett take a similar approach, arguing that moral understanding 
involves the capacities “to create…one’s own moral rules and values,” to justify them to oneself 
and others, and to apply them “imaginatively” by demonstrating insight into the interests of 
others and one’s own weaknesses (1992, 57). Citing certain abnormalities in brain areas 
associated with higher-order cognitive processing, Elliott and Gillett suggest that the psychopath 
is unable to adequately integrate his “actions and intentions with his character and commitments 
to those around him” (ibid, 59-60). Consequently, psychopaths have difficulty forming “stable 
behaviour patterns as rational and social beings,” and this explains their lack of self-regard and 
their inability to care about morality or other people (ibid, 63).18  
Notice that Elliott and Gillett describe the psychopath’s moral deficits in terms of a 
broader defect of practical reason. Moral understanding requires the capacity to value, which in 
turn, requires the capacity for integrated agency, extended over time. This supports a view that 
has become increasingly popular among responsibility theorists: psychopaths might have 
diminished moral accountability because they lack the capacities to adequately coordinate their 
intentions, make realistic, long-term plans, adjust their actions in light of negative outcomes, 
delay desire satisfaction, and engage in normative self-reflection (Litton 2008; Kennett and 
Matthews 2009; Levy 2014).19 
Even those who deny that psychopaths are morally accountable often acknowledge that 
psychopaths have considerable rational capacities, some of which are morally relevant. Duff, for 
18 Watson (2013) proposes that the common ground of the psychopath’s prudential and moral impairments is an 
incapacity for a particular kind of normative orientation. Interestingly, Watson’s proposal concerns the psychopath’s 
inability to value, where valuing includes “having standards for action, intention, and desire that…serve as the basis 
for self-criticism and correction” (2013, 275-6).  
19 Interestingly, Kennett and Matthews (2009) suggest that psychopaths have an impaired capacity for “mental time 
travel.” Neil Levy (2014) takes up this idea, arguing that the psychopath’s difficulty with mental time travel 
obstructs his grasp of moral concepts, such as personhood (and what it means to harm persons), and reduces his 
moral responsibility.  
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example, describes psychopaths as adept in areas of practical reason “having to do with a wide 
range of non-normative beliefs and reasoning” and in “short-term practical reasoning about the 
satisfaction of desires or impulses” (2010, 209). Watson claims that psychopaths are capable of a 
complex mode of reflective agency that distinguishes them from mere brutes. They can “get 
behind” the pain and mischief they cause, and this makes a difference for how we morally 
respond to them (2011, 316). In light of the considerable abilities that psychopaths do have, some 
theorists express skepticism about the claims that psychopaths lack the means to acquire moral 
knowledge or the capacities required for moral competence.20 In addition, some who deny that 
psychopaths are “morally accountable,” and thus inapt targets of resentment, allow that they 
might be morally responsible in other senses.21  
 
3. Progress and Future Directions 
Having surveyed the relevant literature, we are now well-positioned to see what insights we 
might glean from philosophical treatments of psychopathy and practical reason. 
Let’s start with a broad observation. In each of the preceding debates, we find some 
theorists who deem the psychopath “rationally competent” and an opposing group insisting that 
psychopaths lack the relevant competence, except on a deeply impoverished conception of 
practical rationality. As I will show, the arguments that develop from this dispute help to 
20 See, for example, Vargas and Nichols 2007 and Brink 2013.  
21 Watson and Shoemaker, for example, both hold that psychopaths may be morally responsible in the 
“attributability sense,” a sense that tracks the relationship between a person’s actions and her character (Watson 
2011; Shoemaker 2015). Shoemaker delineates a third responsibility category on which psychopaths are sometimes 
responsible: “answerability,” which concerns the agent’s ability to “respond to others’ demands for justification by 
citing their judgments about the worth of some reasons over others” (2015, 27). For an argument against the idea 
that psychopaths are even attributability-responsible, see Nelkin 2015. For an argument that, on some descriptions, 
psychopaths may not even be able to “act for reasons,” see Jaworska 2016.  
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illuminate the richness of practical reason – and human agency more broadly – and suggest 
certain standards for an adequate theory of practical rationality.22  
The relevant arguments implicate (roughly) four intersecting clusters of abilities that bear 
on our capacity for practical reason. Some arguments, for example, emphasize our cognitive 
sophistication. We are complex agents who require intricate coordination, planning, and 
imagination to successfully identify and pursue the means to our ends. Thus, the capacity for 
intelligent, goal-directed behavior may not suffice for practical rationality. Attention deficits, 
disorganized thinking, lack of foresight about the consequences of one’s actions, and poor 
insight into one’s own abilities may undermine one’s capacity for practical reason.  
 The second cluster concerns our abilities to experience emotions and to engage in 
emotional processes. We are not just cognitively sophisticated beings, but we are also emotional 
beings. What’s more, the affective dimension of our psychology is not alienated from practical 
reason. The debate between sentimentalists and rationalists underscores a now widely endorsed, 
but sometimes underappreciated, point: the distinction between cognitive capacities and 
emotional capacities is often nebulous, and even where we can distinguish between them, those 
capacities often work together to facilitate harmonious deliberation and action. Emotions can 
help to facilitate access to certain kinds of reasons, clarify reasons, or even serve as practical 
reasons themselves.23 Thus, emotional deficiencies might shield certain reasons from view 
and/or inhibit one’s ability to act on such reasons.  
 The third cluster concerns our abilities to engage in normative reflection. We can step 
back and make judgments about our desires, beliefs and our reasons for action. We can guide our 
22 Notice here that practical rationality refers to a capacity as opposed to the property that an attitude or act has when 
compliant with requirements of rationality. For more on this distinction, see John Broome’s entry in this volume. 
23 See Patricia Greenspan (2004), along with her entry in this volume, for detailed discussions of the role of emotion 
in practical reason. 
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behavior in light of those evaluative judgments. We often eschew immediate rewards in favor of 
pursuing long-term ends that we deem more worthwhile. And we coordinate our intentions and 
plans accordingly, adjusting course as needed in response to mistakes and new information. The 
preceding debates invite us to consider how deficits in these areas might disrupt one’s agency 
and interfere with one’s ability to make, and to be moved by, normative judgments. If severe 
enough, such deficits would seem to constitute a considerable defect of practical reason.  
The fourth cluster concerns our capacities as valuing agents. We not only make 
evaluative judgments that guide our actions, but we can engage with value in rich and 
constructive ways. We can take a “participant stance” that facilitates a more intimate connection 
with normative material in the world, allowing us to extend and apply our values “creatively.” In 
valuing one’s partner or one’s career, for example, one comes to see those objects of value as 
imbued with a special kind of reason-giving force, and this helps us to understand the meaning 
that others’ values have for them. And the same capacities that ground our abilities to care about, 
and to value, others also seem closely tied to our ability to value ourselves.24 Finally, further 
evidence of our dynamic engagement with normative material comes from our ability to bestow 
value on some object (for example, by loving it) – or again, to create authority-based reasons for 
action by exercising normative powers, as we do when we make demands or certain kinds of 
commitments.25 Many of the arguments in the preceding debates suggest that the abilities to 
value in these ways – and to see the interests and authority of others as reason-giving in the 
relevant sense – are integral to the kind of practical rationality defining of creatures like us. 
Taking seriously the multi-layered nature of practical reason has implications for what we 
should expect from a theory of practical rationality. Minimally, an adequate theory should not 
24 For a Kantian approach to this idea, see Christine Korsgaard 1996.  
25 For recent, illuminating work on normative powers, see Ruth Chang 2013. 
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stand in tension with our remarkably complex rational natures. And all the better for a theory that 
helps to explain how specific aspects of our psychology interact to facilitate recognition and 
responsiveness to reasons for action. The debates canvassed here do not furnish us with a unified 
theory of practical reason, but they are rife with creative insights that raise interesting questions 
to keep in mind as we move forward. For example, are certain affective phenomena, such as the 
dispositions to experience displeasure at cognitive dissonance or regret in response to social 
censure, preconditions for receptivity to certain kinds of reasons? How, and to what extent, 
might deficits in fear and sadness obstruct moral learning? What role might positive emotions 
play in moral reasoning? Given that rational agency and moral competence “go together” in the 
normal cases, what explains the fact that the psychopath’s distinctly moral deficits seem to be far 
more severe than his (general) rational defects? How do impaired capacities for normative 
reflection – or again, for valuing – threaten unified agency? 
By pondering what may have “gone wrong” with the psychopath, we might gain a better 
grasp of how practical reasoning ideally operates in rational persons. In this vein, philosophical 
treatments of psychopathy have laid the ground for considering how other forms of 
psychopathology might inform moral psychology. For example, given that narcissists seem to 
value themselves and yet lack the capacity to value others, how do they fare (compared to 
psychopaths and the general population) as practical reasoners? Do disorders with certain 
pronounced cognitive impairments, such as attention and memory disorders, tend to have 
corresponding emotional abnormalities? And if so, how does this combination of features impact 
moral agency and practical rationality more broadly?  
Given that practical reason consists in a suite of abilities that facilitate rational agency, 
we have a stake not only in identifying those abilities and understanding how they interact, but 
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also in determining their respective significance. Discussions of psychopathy and practical 
reason can help to anchor and guide our thinking about this important issue. First, supposing our 
capacity for practical reason, in part, grounds our statuses as rights-bearers and morally 
responsible agents, we might wonder which specific abilities are required for the relevant 
statuses. Relatedly, as the case of the psychopath demonstrates, there are some individuals who 
have some, but not all, of the relevant abilities. How do we determine whether we should hold 
such individuals legally responsible for their infractions, or again, whether they have rights that 
we are bound to respect (such as the right to refuse medical treatment)? And if narrow rational 
defects can engender more global moral impairment, might our own occasional failures of 
practical rationality be morally significant in unobvious ways? In attempting to answer these 
questions, we move beyond (or perhaps better, expand) the boundaries of practical reason theory, 
now engaging with theories of responsibility and moral standing, as well as exploring 
implications for our social, legal, and medical practices. 
 Mining these debates for insights has raised more questions than it has answered, but 
there is something to be said for identifying the right questions to ask. The preceding discussion 
makes plain our interest in acknowledging that practical reason is not a unary capacity but 
involves a suite of abilities that engage different aspects of our psychology and work together to 
help constitute us as unified agents. Because they can facilitate rich engagement with others and 
help secure our passage into the realm of rights and responsibilities, we have a stake in 
determining how specific capacities might matter for us. As I have argued, the above debates can 
help guide our thinking about the nature, function, and significance of practical reason and aid 
our understanding of the kind of beings we are. 
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